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 NOTE 
Sword or Shield? The Threat of Sovereign 
Immunity in Inter Partes Review  
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274, 
IPR2016-01275, IPR2016-01276, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) 
Alex Weidner* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Subject to few exceptions, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
prevents states from being hailed into federal court.1  Within the context of 
patent law, where all suits must be brought in federal court, states, including 
state entities, entitled to sovereign immunity cannot ordinarily be sued for in-
fringement.2  In the instant case, Covidien LP (“Covidien”) attempted to cir-
cumvent the immunity by filing an administrative challenge to Florida’s pa-
tents rather than an in-court challenge.3  However, rather than hearing the chal-
lenge, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Panel (the “panel”) dismissed the 
petition after holding that sovereign immunity also applies to immunize state 
actors from inter partes review challenges before the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (the “Board”).4  This Note argues the panel’s decision was in error be-
cause sovereign immunity weakens the patent system by preventing patents 
that fail to meet the statutory standards from being struck down, thus creating 
a system in which bad patents can hold entire areas of innovation hostage. 
Part II summarizes the facts and holding of Covidien LP v. University of 
Florida Research Foundation Inc.  Part III provides a short summary of inter 
partes reviews and sovereign immunity and examines the interplay between 
sovereign immunity and administrative proceedings.  Part IV provides an in-
 
* B.S. Mechanical Engineering, University of Missouri, 2016; J.D. Candidate, Univer-
sity of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Layout and Design Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2018-2019.  I am grateful to Professor Crouch for his insight, guidance, and support 
during the writing of this Note as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the 
editing process. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 
1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 2. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627 (1999); Tejas N. Narechania, Note, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical 
Analysis of the “Sword” of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1574 (2010). 
 3. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274, 
IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). 
 4. Id. 
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depth analysis of the reasoning behind the panel’s holding.  Part V argues the 
panel erred in holding that sovereign immunity applies to inter partes review 
and that sovereign immunity is problematic for the patent system.  It then sug-
gests sovereign immunity should be deemed waived by sovereign entities in 
exchange for the granting of a patent to said entities. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
The University of Florida Research Foundation (“UFRF”) was founded 
to assist with the research activities of the University of Florida.5  Part of its 
purpose is to transfer the work product of the University of Florida staff “from 
the laboratory to the public,” frequently through licensing contracts.6 
UFRF exclusively licensed one of its patents to ICU AcquisitionCo Inc. 
(“ICU”).7  The licensed patent covered technology for integrating bedside 
physiologic sensor data and transforming it to a “machine independent for-
mat.”8  Covidien, a manufacturer and seller of global health care products, be-
came the successor in interest to ICU.9  Covidien began paying royalties on the 
sales of its Vital Sync Bedside product, previously known as iCuro.10  How-
ever, Covidien did not pay royalties on its ZephyrLIFE Hospital, ZephyrLIFE 
Home, or Vital Sync VPMP products, arguing those were not covered by the 
license agreement.11  Following an unsuccessful mediation,12 UFRF sued 
Covidien for breach of the license in Florida state court.13  In its counterclaim, 
Covidien sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.14  Covidien then 
removed the suit to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida 
based on the patent counterclaim,15 where UFRF successfully argued that it 
 
 5. University of Florida Research Foundation, UNIV. FLA. OFF. OF RES., http://re-
search.ufl.edu/ufrf.html (last visited June 17, 2018). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Non-Confidential Brief for Defendant-Appellants Medtronic PLC, Med-
tronic, Inc., & Covidien LP at 6, 8, Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc. v. Medtronic 
PLC, No. 2016–2422, 2016 WL 5817687 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2017); Covidien LP’s 
Amended Counterclaim ¶ 1, Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., v. Medtronic PLC, No. 
1:16–cv–183–MW–GRJ, 2016 WL 8609049 (N.D. Fla. July 1, 2016). 
 8. Managing Critical Care Physiologic Data Using Data Synthesis Tech. (DST), 
U.S. Patent No. 7,062,251 (filed Mar. 5, 2004) (issued June 13, 2006). 
 9. Covidien LP’s Amended Counterclaim, supra note 7, ¶ 1; see generally Mini-
mally Invasive Therapies, MEDTRONIC, http://www.medtronic.com/covidien/en-
us/products.html (last visited June 10, 2018).  As the successor in interest, Covidien 
acquired the licenses that ICU possessed.  Id. 
 10. Id. ¶ 21. 
 11. Id. ¶ 22. 
 12. Id. ¶ 4. 
 13. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, No. 1:16CV183-
MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3869877, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016). 
 14. Id. 
 15. This removal was based on a recently enacted statute that made the counter-
claim an independent basis for removal.  Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012) (“A civil 
2
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was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Covidien’s counter-
claim.16  Because the patent counterclaim was dismissed due to sovereign im-
munity, the suit was remanded to state court.17 
Separate from the counterclaim for noninfringement, Covidien filed three 
petitions with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) 
seeking inter partes review of the claims of the licensed patent on June 28, 
2016.18  The petitions were consolidated into a single hearing where UFRF 
sought, and received, permission from the Board to file a motion to dismiss the 
petition based on sovereign immunity.19  In its motion, UFRF argued its status 
as a state entity entitled it a sovereign immunity defense to the institution of an 
inter partes review.20  The panel concluded sovereign immunity applied to such 
proceedings because they were sufficiently similar to Article III proceedings.21  
As a result, the petition to institute an inter partes review was dismissed.22 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part provides an overview of the legal doctrines pertinent to the in-
stant case.  Section A discusses patent law and the inter partes review process, 
and Section B examines sovereign immunity and its impact on administrative 
proceedings. 
A. Overview of Patent Law and the Inter Partes Review Process 
All patent law is built upon the foundation of Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, which provides that the purpose of the patent system is “[t]o pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
 
action in which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights may be removed to the district 
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the 
action is pending.”).  The district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction of patent 
related civil actions arising under an Act of Congress.  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).  
States do not have jurisdiction over these claims.  Id. 
 16. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., 2016 WL 3869877, at *5. 
 17. Id. at *6. 
 18. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274, 
IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017); 
see inter partes review discussion infra Section III.A. 
 19. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at *8–11, *17.  Article III proceedings occur in courts whose power is 
vested in them by Article III of the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. III.  Article III 
courts include federal district and circuit courts as well as the United States Supreme 
Court.  Id. art. III, § 1. 
 22. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1. 
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authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries.”23  The core patentability doctrines of patent eligibility,24 novelty,25 
nonobviousness,26 and enablement 27 were built upon this foundation.28 
These four patentability doctrines function as a series of gates that a pa-
tent application must pass through to be deemed worthy of patent protection.29  
Should an application fail to satisfy one of the doctrines’ requirements, a patent 
will not be granted.30  In fact, even issued patents may be invalidated if it is 
shown they fail to meet the requirements of any of the four doctrines.31  How-
ever, for the purpose of this Note and for inter partes review, only novelty and 
nonobviousness play a significant role.32  To be novel, an invention must not 
be anticipated by prior art.33  An invention is anticipated “only if each and every 
element” of a patent’s claims can be found “in a single prior art reference.”34  
The invention must also be nonobvious.35  A determination of obviousness is 
made “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are 
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 
1, 5 (1966) (“The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.”); see generally 60 
AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 1, Westlaw (database updated 2018). 
 24. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and use-
ful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and re-
quirements of this title.”). 
 25. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 26. See id. § 103 (2012). 
 27. See id. § 112(a) (2012). 
 28. See 69 C.J.S. Patents § 16, Westlaw (database updated 2018). 
 29. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 30. C.J.S., supra note 28, § 16. 
 31. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
 32. See id. § 311(b) (2012). 
 33. Id. § 102 (2012).  Prior art is defined as: 
 
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in 
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective fil-
ing date of the claimed invention; or 
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or 
in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 
122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another 
inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention. 
 
Id. § 102(a). 
 34. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(citing Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 715 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
4
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effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”36 
Inter partes review, which was implemented as part of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, is a means of challenging the validity of a patent at the 
USPTO rather than in court.37  The inter partes review process begins when “a 
person who is not the owner of a patent . . . file[s] with [the USPTO] a petition 
to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”38  The “petitioner . . . may 
request to cancel as unpatentable [one] or more claims of a patent only on a 
ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of 
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”39 
However, the proceeding “shall not be instituted for a ground of unpatent-
ability unless the [Board] decides that the petition supporting the ground would 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims 
challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”40  If the petition is dismissed, the 
decision cannot be appealed unless it would “implicate constitutional questions 
. . . or . . . present other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms of scope 
and impact, well beyond [the USPTO’s decision to initiate inter partes re-
view.]”41 
If an inter partes review is instituted, the process allows a response to the 
petition to be filed, discovery, the filing of motions, and amendment or cancel-
lation of patent claims, provided the patent owner does not seek to broaden 
them.42  Next, “the . . . Board shall issue a final written decision with respect 
to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any 
new claim added under section  316(d).”43  Once the decision has been issued, 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 311, 125 Stat. 284, 
299 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012)). 
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (italics omitted). 
 39. Id. § 311(b); see generally id. § 102 (2012) (novelty condition); id. § 103 
(2012) (nonobviousness requirement). 
 40. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2016).  Something is unpatentable if it fails to meet the 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112, or some other statutory requirement.  With 
regard to inter partes review, a patent may only be invalidated due to a § 102 or § 103 
deficiency. 
 41. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) (“The determination by the Director whether to 
institute an inter partes review under this section hall be final and nonappealable”); 
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016) (“[W]e emphasize 
that our interpretation applies where the grounds for attacking the decision to institute 
inter partes review consist of questions that are closely tied to the application and in-
terpretation of statues related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes re-
view.”). 
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2012).  Note that once the patent has issued, the claims may 
only be broadened by filing a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. § 251 within two 
years of the date of issuance for the patent.  35 U.S.C. § 251(d) (2012). 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012).  “During an inter partes review instituted under this 
chapter, the patent owner may file [one] motion to amend the patent in [one] or more 
5
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the matter can be appealed.44  If no appeal is taken, or once the appeal is termi-
nated, the director issues and publishes a certificate, which has the effect of 
“canceling any claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable, con-
firming any claim of the patent determined to be patentable, and incorporating 
in the patent by operation of the certificate any new or amended claim deter-
mined to be patentable.” 45 
B. Sovereign Immunity and its Impact on Administrative Proceedings 
The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”46  This has long been construed 
to mean that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment limits the judicial authority of the 
federal courts and bars unconsented suit against a state.”47  While the impact 
of sovereign immunity on Article III proceedings is well-established, its impact 
on administrative proceedings has been frequently contested.  The United 
States Supreme Court has indicated that immunity applies in administrative 
proceedings that are court-like – i.e., any proceeding substantially similar to an 
Article III proceeding.48 
The leading United States Supreme Court precedent comes from the 2002 
decision of Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Au-
thority.49  In Federal Maritime, a cruise ship company filed a complaint with 
the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”) after repeatedly being denied per-
mission to dock a cruise ship at the South Carolina State Ports Authority’s 
(“SCSPA’s”) facilities.50  An administrative law judge initially determined that 
“as an arm of the State of South Carolina, [SCSPA] was ‘entitled to sovereign 
immunity.’”51  However, the FMC reversed sua sponte after determining that 
“[t]he doctrine of state sovereign immunity . . . is meant to cover proceedings 
before judicial tribunals, whether Federal or state, not executive branch admin-
istrative agencies like the [FMC].”52  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
 
of the following ways: (A) Cancel any challenged patent claim.  (B) For each chal-
lenged claim, propose a reasonable number of substitute claims.”  Id. § 316(d)(1) 
(2012). 
 44. Id. § 319 (2012). 
 45. Id. § 318(b). 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 47. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 48. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751, 761 (2002). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 747–48. 
 51. Id. at 749. 
 52. Id. at 750 (alternation in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, 
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (No. 01-46)). 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss3/13
2018] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INTER PARTES REVIEW 893 
Circuit then reversed the FMC, reestablishing immunity.53  The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether sovereign immunity 
applies to adjudications conducted by the FMC.54 
The Court determined “[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign im-
munity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sov-
ereign entities.”55  Further, “[t]he affront to a State’s dignity does not lessen 
when an adjudication takes place in an administrative tribunal as opposed to an 
Article III court” because “[i]n both instances, a State is required to defend 
itself in an adversarial proceeding against a private party before an impartial 
federal officer.”56  Additionally, because “it would be quite strange to prohibit 
Congress from exercising its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity in Article III judicial proceedings but permit the use of those same Ar-
ticle I powers to create court-like administrative tribunals where sovereign im-
munity does not apply,”57 the Court agreed with, and affirmed, the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision that sovereign immunity applies to both Article III proceedings 
and any other proceeding that “walks, talks, and squawks very much like a 
lawsuit.”58 
In Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of University of Missouri,59 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, while “a state’s participation in the 
federal patent system does not of itself waive immunity in federal court with 
respect to patent infringement by the state,” the University of Missouri waived 
its immunity by initiating and participating fully in an interference proceed-
ing.60  In Vas-Cath, the University of Missouri copied nineteen of Vas-Cath’s 
claims to initiate an interference proceeding – a proceeding conducted by the 
USPTO “for the purpose of determining priority of invention as between com-
peting applicants for patent on the same invention.”61  The University of Mis-
souri was awarded priority by the USPTO, and Vas-Cath appealed the decision 
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.62  The University of 
Missouri transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Missouri and asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal 
court, causing the case to be dismissed.63  Vas-Cath appealed the dismissal to 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 751. 
 55. Id. at 760 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)). 
 56. Id. at 760–61. 
 57. Id. at 761 (citation omitted). 
 58. Id. at 751 (quoting S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165, 
174 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 59. 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 60. Id. at 1381, 1385. 
 61. Id. at 1378–79; see generally MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE 
§ 2303 (9th ed.) (providing a more in-depth explanation of interference proceedings). 
 62. Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379. 
 63. Id. at 1379–80.  The case was transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), 
which states that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue 
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer 
7
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the Federal Circuit, arguing the University of Missouri waived its immunity by 
participating in, and benefiting from, the interference proceeding.64 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the waiver argument, stating, “[T]he Uni-
versity cannot both retain the fruits of [the interference proceeding] and bar the 
losing party from its statutory right of review, even if that review is conducted 
in federal court.”65  Acknowledging the holding in Federal Maritime, the Fed-
eral Circuit stated that “[l]ike proceedings in the [FMC], contested interference 
proceedings in the [US]PTO bear ‘strong similarities’ to civil litigation . . . and 
the administrative proceeding can indeed be characterized as a lawsuit” be-
cause “[US]PTO interferences involve adverse parties, examination and cross-
examination by deposition of witnesses, production of documentary evidence, 
findings by an impartial federal adjudicator, and power to implement the deci-
sion.”66  However, the Federal Circuit concluded that “when the University 
initiated and participated in the interference, its participation included the en-
suing statutory review procedures,” and therefore the University of Missouri 
could not use the Eleventh Amendment to prevent the agency decision from 
review by a federal court.67 
The United States Supreme Court also addressed the issue of waiver in 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank,68 holding the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (the “TRCA”) did 
not abrogate Florida’s sovereign immunity.69  In College Savings, College Sav-
ings Bank (“CSB”) sued Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board (“FPPEE”) for violating section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by making 
misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual re-
ports.70  FPPEE asserted its sovereign immunity, arguing the TRCA did not 
 
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1406(a) (2012); see also Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379. 
 64. Id. at 1380. 
 65. Id. at 1385. 
 66. Id. at 1382 (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)). 
 67. Id. at 1384. 
 68. 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 69. Id. at 691. 
 70. Id. at 670–71.  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides: 
 
(a) Civil action 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which – 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as 
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commer-
cial activities by another person, or 
8
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abrogate its immunity.71  Both the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,72 and the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether [section 43(a) of the Lanham Act] is effective to permit suit 
against a State for its alleged misrepresentation of its own product –
either because the TRCA effects a constitutionally permissible abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity, or because the TRCA operates as an 
invitation to waiver of such immunity which is automatically accepted 
by a State’s engaging in the activities regulated by the Lanham Act.73 
The Court emphasized the importance of sovereign immunity, noting, 
“[S]overeign immunity is ‘a personal privilege which [a state] may waive at 
pleasure,’”74 and “the decision to waive that immunity . . . ‘is altogether vol-
untary on the part of the sovereignty.’”75  The Court continued, declaring “a 
State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the condi-
tions of its waiver and apply those changes to a pending suit.”76  Because there 
was no property right in freedom from a competitor’s false advertising, the 
Court found the TRCA did not create a constitutionally permissible abrogation 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.77  Similarly, the Court found no waiver be-
cause FPPEE did not expressly consent to being sued in federal court and be-
cause there was little distinction between Congress’ attempt at removing sov-
ereign immunity via participation in interstate commerce and simply abrogat-
ing the immunity.78 
 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, charac-
teristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, 
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person 
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
 71. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 671. 
 72. Id. at 672; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Ex-
pense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’g, 948 F. Supp. 400, 428 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 73. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 669. 
 74. Id. at 675 (quoting Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 463, 447 (1883)). 
 75. Id. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857)). 
 76. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).  The court provided an example of such a situation 
by citing Petty v. Tennessee–Missouri Bridge Commission, where a suability provision 
attached to the congressional approval of an interstate compact was sufficient to con-
stitute a constructive waiver of sovereign immunity.  Id. at 686; see Petty v. Tenn.–Mo. 
Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). 
 77. Id. at 673–74; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fourteenth Amend-
ment predominantly deals with “equal protection” and “due process of law.”  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 78. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676, 683–84. 
9
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IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The panel dismissed Covidien’s petitions because it determined that “Pa-
tent Owner UFRF, as an arm of the State of Florida, [was] entitled to a sover-
eign immunity defense to the institution of an inter partes review of the chal-
lenged patent.”79  The panel first examined sovereign immunity in administra-
tive proceedings by looking to the Eleventh Amendment as well as the Federal 
Maritime and Vas-Cath decisions.80  The panel then considered whether the 
Federal Maritime decision applied to inter partes review proceedings, and if 
so, how it applies to them.81  Finally, the panel addressed the issue of whether 
UFRF was an arm of the State of Florida.82 
The panel first concluded the Federal Maritime decision applied to inter 
partes review.83  In coming to this conclusion, the panel examined the nature 
of an inter partes proceeding and compared it to the proceeding in Federal 
Maritime.84  The panel observed “that the term inter partes means between the 
parties, which in itself captures the notion that the proceeding is directed to 
both parties over whom the Board exercises jurisdiction.”85  Additionally, the 
panel noted that “[t]he statutes and rules governing inter partes reviews are 
consistent with this view.”86  The panel cited § 42.105 of title 37 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations, which requires a petition and evidence to be served on 
the patent owner, and § 42.106 of title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
which states the petition will not be accorded a filing date until the petition 
satisfies a list of requirements, including service on the correspondence address 
provided in § 42.105(a) of title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.87  In 
addition, “[a] petition to institute an inter partes review must identify ‘each 
claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, 
 
 79. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274, 
IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) 
(italics omitted). 
 80. Id. at *2; see Eleventh Amendment, Federal Marine, and Vas-Cath discus-
sions supra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
 81. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *3, *5–11. 
 82. Id. at *12–17. 
 83. Id. at *12. 
 84. Id. at *9–11 (discussing the similarities between civil litigation and inter partes 
reviews). 
 85. Id. at *6 (italics omitted). 
 86. Id. (italics omitted). 
 87. Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 42.105 (2016) (“In addition to the requirements of § 42.6, the 
petitioner must serve the petition and exhibits relied upon in the petition.”); 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.106(a) (2016) (italics omitted) (“A petition to institute inter partes review will not 
be accorded a filing date until the petition satisfies all of the following requirements: 
(1) Complies with § 42.104; (2) Effects service of the petition on the correspondence 
address of record as provided in § 42.105(a); and (3) Is accompanied by the fee to 
institute required in § 42.15(a).”).  
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and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”88  
The patent owner may respond to the petition, and the USPTO must decide 
whether to institute an inter partes review within three months.89  The USPTO 
may not institute such a review unless there is a “reasonable likelihood” at least 
one of the claims is likely unpatentable.90  Finally, the panel stated, “the 
Board’s role in the inter partes review is not unlike that of the Commission in 
FMC, which is to assess the merits of the arguments presented by the parties 
in an impartial manner.”91  Because inter partes proceedings closely resemble 
the proceeding in the Federal Maritime decision, the panel determined the Fed-
eral Maritime analysis should be applied to inter partes reviews.92 
After determining the proceeding in Federal Maritime was sufficiently 
similar to inter partes review, the panel applied Federal Maritime’s analysis to 
determine whether sovereign immunity applied to inter partes review.93  This 
involved comparing inter partes reviews to civil suits to determine if the two 
were similar enough for sovereign immunity to apply in inter partes reviews.94  
The panel found that “inter partes reviews are adversarial ‘contested cases be-
tween a patent owner and a petitioner in which the petitioner bears the burden 
of proof and initiates the proceedings by filing a petition requesting the insti-
tut[ion of] a trial.’”95  It also discussed the patent owner’s argument that inter 
partes reviews are “held before panels of three impartial administrative patent 
judges . . . , immune from political influence, who serve a role functionally 
comparable to that of an Article III judge.”96 
The parties are also allowed to engage in motion practice similar to that 
of a civil suit.97  Even the discovery “procedures of an inter partes review are 
similar . . . to those in federal court litigation” because 
[t]he parties are entitled to “routine discovery” that includes production 
of “any exhibit cited in a paper or in testimony must be served with the 
citing paper or testimony,” cross-examination of affidavit testimony 
prepared for the proceeding, and “information that is inconsistent with 
a position advanced by the party during the proceeding concurrent with 
the filing of the documents or things that contain the inconsistency.”98 
 
 88. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *7 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012)). 
 89. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. §314(b) (2012). 
 90. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *7 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012)). 
 91. Id. (citation omitted). 
 92. Id. at *8. 
 93. Id. at *8–12. 
 94. See id. at 8. 
 95. Id. at *8–9 (alteration in original) (italics omitted) (quoting Patent Owner’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 9, Covidien LP v. Uni. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. 
IPR2016–01274, IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 2016)). 
 96. Id. at *8 (citing Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 8–9). 
 97. Id. at *8. 
 98. Id. at *10 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (1)(i)-(iii) (2016)). 
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The panel analyzed whether UFRF had waived its immunity in a manner 
similar to the University of Missouri in Vas-Cath and determined that UFRF 
had not taken any action sufficient to constitute waiver.99  Because of the over-
whelming similarities between inter partes review and civil suits, the panel 
concluded “that the considerable resemblance between the two is sufficient to 
implicate the immunity afforded to the States by the Eleventh Amendment,” 
and therefore, “Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the institution of an inter 
partes review against an unconsenting state that has not waived sovereign im-
munity.”100 
Finally, the panel examined whether UFRF was an arm of the State of 
Florida and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity.101  The panel looked to 
the following factors in making its determination: “(1) how state law defines 
the entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; (3) 
where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments 
against the entity.”102  Addressing the first factor, the panel concluded UFRF’s 
“statutory origin” and direct support organization (“DSO”) status “weigh[ed] 
in favor” of finding UFRF to be an arm of Florida.103  For the second factor, 
 
 99. Compare id. at *12 (initiating an inter partes review), with Vas-Cath, Inc. v. 
Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 743 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (initiating and 
participating in an interference). 
 100. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11–12 (italics omitted). 
 101. See id. at *12–17. 
 102. Id. at *12 (citing Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc)). 
 103. Id. at *13.  In support of this finding, the panel referenced the University of 
Florida Financial report.  Id. at *12.  The relevant portion stated: 
 
[T]he University’s direct-support organizations, as provided for in Section 
1004.28, Florida Statutes, and Board of Governors Regulation 9.011, are con-
sidered component units of the University of Florida and therefore the latest 
audited financial statements of these organizations are discretely presented in 
the financial statements of the University.  These legally separate, not-for-profit 
corporations are organized and operated exclusively to assist the University to 
achieve excellence by providing supplemental resources from private gifts and 
bequests, and valuable education support services. The Statute authorizes these 
organizations to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make ex-
penditures to or for the benefit of the University. 
 
Id. at *13.  In conjunction with the report, the panel cited a Florida statute that defines 
“University direct-support organization” as: 
 
1. A Florida corporation not for profit incorporated under the provisions of 
chapter 617 and approved by the Department of State. 
2. Organized and operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer 
property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of a state university in 
Florida or for the benefit of a research and development park or research and 
development authority affiliated with a state university and organized under 
part V of chapter 159. 
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the panel relied on two of the district court’s findings.104  First, “the Board of 
Trustees for the University of Florida prescribes the conditions with which 
UFRF must comply in order to use property, facilities, or personal services at 
any state university.”105  Second, UFRF’s bylaws require its budget to be ap-
proved by the president of the university.106  Those two combined findings 
were used by the panel to conclude the State had a high degree of control over 
UFRF.107  For the third factor, the panel found that UFRF received its funding 
through the university because the financial report stated the university consid-
ered UFRF’s assets and liabilities to be its own.108  Finally, the panel concluded 
the State’s laws controlling UFRF’s ability to issue debt evidenced a “consid-
erable degree of control” over UFRF.109  Since each of the four factors weighed 
in UFRF’s favor, the panel concluded UFRF was entitled to sovereign immun-
ity.110 
Because the panel determined sovereign immunity could be asserted in 
an inter partes review and because the UFRF was deemed an arm of the State 
of Florida that had not waived its sovereign immunity, the proceedings were 
dismissed.111 
V. COMMENT 
This Part argues that the panel erred in holding sovereign immunity ap-
plied to inter partes review.  Section A argues that, as a matter of policy, shield-
ing patents from challenge goes against the very purpose of the patent system.  
Section B suggests sovereign entities should be deemed to have waived their 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in all proceedings involving their 
patents, especially in situations where the patentee has engaged in licensing or 
other market activity involving the patent. 
 
3. An organization that a state university board of trustees, after review, has 
certified to be operating in a manner consistent with the goals of the university 
and in the best interest of the state. Any organization that is denied certification 
by the board of trustees shall not use the name of the university that it serves. 
 
Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Fla. STAT. § 1004.28 (1)(a)(1)–(3) (2014)). 
 104. Id. (citing Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Medtronic, No. 1:16CV183-
MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3869877, at *2–3 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016)). 
 105. Id. (citing Univ. of Florida Research Found. Inc., 2016 WL 3869877, at *2). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at *15. 
 108. Id. at *15–16. 
 109. Id. at *16. 
 110. Id. at *17. 
 111. Id. 
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A.  Sovereign Immunity is Problematic for Reasons of Policy 
The decision in Covidien is troubling for several reasons.  First, because 
the panel decided whether to institute an inter partes review based on 
Covidien’s petition, the decision may not be appealable.112  By holding that 
sovereign immunity applied to inter partes review, the panel fundamentally al-
tered the patent system.113  An unreviewable change of such magnitude made 
by a trio of administrative patent judges, rather than the legislature, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or the Supreme Court of the United 
States, is deeply concerning because it ignores well-established methods of 
creating and construing law. 
The decision is also troubling as a matter of policy.  The stringent require-
ments a patent must meet, both during and after prosecution, are designed to 
ensure only those patents that truly deserve protection receive it.114  Sovereign 
immunity does not affect the examination or reexamination of patents, but, as 
seen in Covidien, it blocks the patent from being challenged by lawsuit or inter 
partes review.115  By sheltering patents owned by sovereign entities, those who 
would file a petition for inter partes review are prevented from invalidating 
patents that fail to meet the statutory requirements.116  In essence, sovereign 
immunity is a means of protecting “bad” patents from scrutiny.  This is a major 
issue because a single patent can control an entire field of innovation.117 
 
 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) (“The determination by the Director whether to 
institute an inter partes review . . . shall be final and nonappealable.”); Cuozzo Speed 
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016) (italics omitted) (“Congress has told 
the Patent Office to determine whether inter partes review should proceed, and it has 
made the agency’s decision ‘final’ and ‘nonappealable.’  Our conclusion that courts 
may not revisit this initial determination gives effect to this statutory command.”) (al-
teration in original). 
 113. See Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *12. 
 114. See discussion of patentability requirements discussion supra Section III.A. 
 115. Covidien, 2017 WL4015009, at *2, *17. 
 116. While the patent prosecution process is designed to weed out bad applications, 
time constraints on examiners can often lead to the issuance of patents that should have 
been rejected.  See Mark A. Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office, STAN. INST. ECON. POL’Y 
RES. 6–7 (2012), https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/11-
014_0.pdf.  This, in part, leads to the creation of post-grant review, reexamination, and 
reissue; C. Gregory Gramenopoulos & Elliot C. Cook, Divine Intervention: Intervening 
Rights Based on Post-Grant Examination, Before and After Leahy-Smith America In-
vents Act (AIA), CHARTERED INST. PATENT ATT’YS J. (June 2012), https://www.finne-
gan.com/en/insights/divine-intervention-intervening-rights-based-on-post-grant.html.  
The ability to invalidate a patent by suit also helps eliminate patents that slipped 
through the cracks during the examination process.  Lemley, supra, at 13. 
 117. See generally Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Patents in Renewable 
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For example, imagine if a sovereign entity had owned the Wright broth-
ers’ patent, and assume the patent was a “bad” one that could have been inval-
idated if not for sovereign immunity.  In this situation, nearly all progress in 
the field of aeronautics would have been halted for the life of the patent.  If not 
for the sovereign entity, another inventor could have challenged the “bad” pa-
tent and had it invalidated.  In fact, if a non-sovereign entity had owned the 
patent, then that is precisely what would have occurred.  This hypothetical 
highlights the threat sovereign immunity poses to both innovation and the U.S. 
patent system.  If a bad patent is allowed to survive, especially if it controls an 
entire field of innovation, sheltering that patent harms the public interest of 
innovation and corporate interests of economic growth. 
Additionally, governmental entities that hold such patents typically li-
cense them to outside companies.118  Because the government will retain own-
ership of the patent, licensing allows a corporation to use the patent without 
fear of having it invalidated.  This is an unfair market advantage when com-
pared with companies that develop their own technology and own the patent 
themselves.  For example, if it is assumed Company A leases a patent from a 
sovereign entity that could be invalidated while Company B owns a similar 
patent, then Company A will be safe to continue using the patent, and Company 
B will have its patent invalidated.  By creating multiple means of challenging 
bad patents, Congress and the USPTO implicitly encourage invalidation of pa-
tents that cannot withstand scrutiny.119  Protecting those patents that cannot 
stand on their own decreases the strength of, and breeds distrust in, the entire 
patent system. 
This issue will only grow more prevalent as universities and other aca-
demic institutions become more heavily involved in research.  In 1985, 594 
utility patents were issued to academic institutions.120  By 2012, that number 
had risen to 4797 utility patents.121  Similarly, since the Florida Prepaid and 
College Savings decisions, patent applications filed by public universities have 
increased by twenty-four percent per million dollars spent, and filings from 
private universities have increased by thirty-four percent per million dollars 
spent.122  Even more dramatic has been the increase in licensing since the two 
decisions.123  The average number of active patent licenses for public universi-
ties has increased by over fifty-five percent, and the average number of private 
school active patent licenses has increased by forty percent.124 This trend is 
 
 118. See, e.g., Narechania, supra note 2, at 1612; see also Licensing, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., https://www.ars.usda.gov/office-of-technology-transfer/licensing/ (last visited 
June 20, 2018). 
 119. See discussion regarding challenging patents supra Section III.A. 
 120. See U.S. College and Universities – Utility Patent Grants 1969–2012, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/doc/doc_info_2012.htm (last 
visited June 20, 2018). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Narechania, supra note 2, at 1958 tbl.4, tbl.5. 
 123. See id. at 1601 tbl.8. 
 124. Id. 
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likely to continue, increasing the number of unduly sheltered patents while 
simultaneously restricting innovation in countless fields.  Further, the panel’s 
decision is not restricted to academic institutions.125  As a result, other state 
government institutions that hold patents may exacerbate this problem should 
they seek to exploit sovereign immunity and prevent their patents from being 
challenged. 
B. Sovereign Immunity Should Be Deemed Waived in Patent Proceed-
ings 
This Section proposes that any patent grant should incorporate a waiver 
of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.  Sovereign immunity poses a 
significant problem to both inter partes review and the overall patent process.  
However, both problems can be solved by incorporating a waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity into the patent contract between the USPTO 
and the applicant.  This solution is not only synergistic with early patent law, 
but it also avoids the fact Congress itself cannot unilaterally abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity without constitutional amend-
ment.126 
To solve the issue with abrogating state sovereign immunity via legisla-
tion, it is helpful to examine similar issues that have arisen in the past.  It ap-
pears early English patents were issued with a clause authorizing revocation if 
“it turns out [the patent] was improperly issued or bec[ame] ‘prejudicial or in-
convenient.’”127  Next, it is useful to look at more modern sources to see if they 
provide assistance in devising a solution.  In her article entitled Beyond Abro-
gation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private Contract, and Federal 
Incentives, Christina Bohannan128 examined, in light of the holding in College 
Savings, that there were three situations where a state would be considered to 
 
 125. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 632 n.3, 647–48 (1999) (finding a state and its arms are protected by the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
 126. See id. at 647–48 (holding that Congress does not have authority to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to patent infringement by the states). 
 127. Dennis Crouch, Correction: Bracha Was Exactly Correct About the Privy 
Council Exception, PATENTLYO (August 23, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/pa-
tent/2017/08/correction-exactly-exception.html [hereinafter Correction]. 
 128. Christina Bohannan is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law 
who specializes in intellectual property, First Amendment, and competition law.  
Christina Bohannan, UNIV. IOWA C.L., https://law.uiowa.edu/christina-bohannan (last 
visited June 20, 2018).  She has published many works dealing with patents and intel-
lectual property, one of which was cited favorably by the United States Supreme 
Court in the landmark patent case Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labor-
atories, Inc.  Christina Bohannan–CV, UNIV. IOWA C.L., 
https://law.uiowa.edu/sites/law.uiowa.edu/files/bohannan.pdf (last visited June 20, 
2018); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
86, 92 (2012). 
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have waived its immunity: (1) by failing to assert immunity as a defense, (2) 
“by agree[ing] in a private contract,” and (3) by accepting federal funds that 
were conditioned upon waiving immunity.129  With regard to contractual waiv-
ers, she concluded that courts should enforce voluntary waivers of immunity 
and prevent states from reconsidering their waiver when sued.130 
Patents are most often thought of as a form of intellectual property, but 
they are also considered a form of contract.131  While the terms of a patent “do 
not themselves explicitly recite the terms of a contract between the sovereign 
and the patentee, such is implicit from the provisions of the patent statute.”132  
Because a patent can be deemed a type of contract, the terms of the contract 
between the applicant and the USPTO can theoretically be negotiated.  In fact, 
the current patenting system already involves an exchange of consideration be-
tween the two parties.133  In return for a limited monopoly over the invention,134 
the applicant must satisfactorily disclose the invention to the public and allow 
it to enter the public domain once the patent expires.135 
The fact that patents have been deemed a form of contract is significant 
because it allows for the waiver of sovereign immunity.  While Congress is 
prevented from explicitly abrogating the Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity of the states via legislation,136 there is nothing preventing Congress or 
the USPTO from altering the patent contract between the USPTO and the pa-
tentee.  In fact, the United States Supreme Court explicitly said as much in 
College Savings by noting that “a State may, absent any contractual commit-
ment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its waiver and apply those changes 
to a pending suit.”137  As a result, it would be possible to amend the terms of 
the contract between the USPTO and the patentee to add the requirement that 
sovereign entities who choose to obtain patents must waive their immunity in 
all proceedings involving those patents.138  The proposed waiver would apply 
even to those patents issued to a third party but later transferred to a sovereign 
entity.  Adding this requirement would avoid the issue of abrogating immunity 
via legislation because the waiver would be contractual and voluntary.  If the 
governmental applicant did not consent to waiving its immunity, it would still 
 
 129. Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waiv-
ers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 273, 277 (2002) 
(emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 303. 
 131. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:2 (2d 
ed. 2018). 
 132. Id. (citing Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 242 (1832)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
 135. MILLS ET AL., supra note 131; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 136. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 666, 691 (1999). 
 137. Id. at 676 (emphasis added). 
 138. See id. 
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be free to forego attaining a patent and attempt to keep its invention as a trade 
secret instead. 
This change would be similar to early English patents in the sense that 
part of the patent agreement would involve a clause permitting a challenge to 
the patent.139  Like the clause used in early English patents allowing the King 
and Privy Council to invalidate a patent,140 adding the requirement that all en-
tities waive any sovereign immunity in claims regarding their patent would 
prevent patents from being immune to challenge.  Further, the existence of a 
basis in American and English law141 for such an argument to be made indi-
cates that the solution may be effective. 
The proposed solution would also address other issues caused by sover-
eign immunity.  For example, a problem currently exists involving corporations 
using the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes to shield the corporations’ pa-
tents from review.142  Allergan, a global pharmaceutical company, “transferred 
title to all of its Restasis patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe” in an attempt 
to immunize its patents, some of which were already being challenged before 
the Board, from inter partes review.143  The decision to transfer title to its pa-
tents was based in part upon universities, such as UFRF, having been quite 
successful fending off “both [inter partes review] and declaratory judgments 
lawsuits – even when the patents are exclusively licensed to commercial enti-
ties.”144 
The response to Allergan’s decision to transfer title to the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe and thereby utilize the tribe’s sovereign immunity to protect the 
patents has been swift.145  Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill introduced Sen-
ate Bill 1948, titled, “A bill to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes 
as a defense in inter partes review of patents.”146  The text of the bill is as 
follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an Indian tribe may not 
assert sovereign immunity as a defense in a review that is conducted under 
 
 139. See Correction, supra note 127.  It should be noted that early English patents 
functioned quite differently from the modern patent.  With regard to invalidation by the 
Privy Council, however, the inter partes review process is similar in that both involve 
a tribunal invalidating a patent post-issue because the patent was improperly issued.  
This similarity allows for useful comparisons on the issue of waiver despite the vast 
differences between the early English and modern American patent systems. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id.; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676. 
 142. See Dennis Crouch, Allergan: Creating Sovereign Immunity with Tribal Pass-
Through, PATENTLYO (September 8, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/09/aller-
gan-creating-sovereign.html [hereinafter Allergan]. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Dennis Crouch, A Bill to Abrogate the Sovereign Immunity of Indian 
Tribes as a Defense in Inter Partes Review of Patents, PATENTLYO (October 6, 2017), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/10/abrogate-sovereign-immunity.html [hereinafter 
A Bill]. 
 146. Id. (italics omitted). 
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chapter 31 of title 35, United States Code.”147  This quick response indicates 
that at least a portion of Congress thinks that allowing corporations to utilize 
the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes to immunize their patents from inter 
partes review poses a significant threat to the patent system. 
A governmental entity, such as a university, utilizing its state’s sovereign 
immunity is no different from Allergan’s use of the Indian tribe’s sovereign 
immunity and is equally problematic.  Unfortunately, because the United States 
Supreme Court has held Congress cannot abrogate the states’ sovereign im-
munity, the instant problem cannot be addressed in the same way.148  Never-
theless, the basic idea of disallowing sovereign immunity in inter partes pro-
ceedings can be used to craft a potential solution. 
The proposed change would also be similar to the bill introduced by Sen-
ator McCaskill.  It would effectively prevent the use of sovereign immunity by 
any party, including Indian tribes, in inter partes review or other patent pro-
ceedings.149  In fact, it would solve the Indian tribe issue without the need to 
pass legislation specifically targeting native tribes’ sovereign immunity in inter 
partes review.150  It would also be an evenhanded solution because it would 
target companies, like Allergan, that seek to utilize the sovereign immunity of 
Indian tribes151 and governmental organizations asserting state immunity 
equally.152 
The proposed solution also fits the intent of the patentability,153 nov-
elty,154 nonobviousness,155 and enablement statutes.156  These statutes are de-
signed to ensure patents are held to a certain standard; preventing sovereign 
immunity from applying in any patent proceeding would ensure that all patents, 
regardless of the entity that owns them, could be challenged on the basis of 
failure to meet this standard.  This furthers the goal of allowing only good pa-
tents to be entitled to protection. 
 
 147. A Bill to Abrogate the Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes as a Defense in 
Inter Partes Review of Patents, S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017); see also A Bill, supra note 
145. 
 148. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274, 
IPR2016–0127, IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *3 (P.T.A.B. 
Jan. 25, 2017) (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760–
61 (2002)). 
 149. See A Bill, supra note 145. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See generally Allergan, supra note 142. 
 152. See, e.g., Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009. 
 153. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 154. Id. § 102 (2012). 
 155. Id. § 103 (2012). 
 156. Id. § 112 (2012). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In Covidien, the panel held that sovereign immunity applies to inter partes 
proceedings.157  This decision was not only an unreviewable one that funda-
mentally altered patent law but was also problematic for policy reasons.158  Al-
lowing government entities, such as universities, to assert sovereign immunity 
in the patent context creates an uneven playing field where bad patents are 
made unchallengeable.  This allows the universities, and those corporations 
that license their inventions, to infringe upon others’ patents or hold an area of 
innovation hostage even when their patent would otherwise be voided for fail-
ure to meet one of the statutory requirements of a patent.  Such action stunts 
innovation, hurts businesses by preventing research into lucrative fields, and 
breeds distrust in the patent system. 
However, the problem created by the Covidien decision can be rectified.  
By requiring every applicant to elect to waive any rights it may possess to sov-
ereign immunity prior to granting a patent, all patents would be subject to chal-
lenge on their merits.  Such a solution would have the effect of improving or 
maintaining the current quality of patents and ensuring innovation is not halted 
by the invincibility of a keystone patent.  The solution accords with early Eng-
lish patents159 and current U.S. patent law;160 it also addresses the secondary 
issue of use of an Indian tribe’s sovereign immunity by corporations.161  While 
the panel’s decision may be unreviewable,162 it is not too late for the USPTO 
to address the significant threat that sovereign immunity poses to the public, to 
corporations, and to the patent system by altering the contractual terms of a 
patent grant to require waiver of sovereign immunity. 
 
 157. See Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11. 
 158. See discussion supra Section V.A. 
 159. See Correction, supra note 127. 
 160. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012). 
 161. See A Bill, supra note 145. 
 162. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012). 
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